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"THE LION OF THE DAY": 
DIPLOMACY, STATES' RIGHTS, 
AND PARTY POLITICS IN THE 
AROOSTOOK WAR 
BY JOHN A. SOARES, JR. 
Historians typically dismiss the so-called Aroostook War as an insignifi-
cant event that unfolded in the uncivilized northeast frontier. Yet this 
seemingly minor conflict allows us to examine how both partisan politics 
and the growing debate over national and state authority dominated po-
litical and diplomatic affairs in the antebellum period. This political 
contest highlights the roles played by Winfield Scott, a Whig, and John 
Fairfield, a Democrat, in achieving an acceptable compromise between 
Maine and New Brunswick. Like many regional affairs of this time, the 
Aroostook War can only be fully understood within this national context. 
John A. Soares, Jr. is a visiting assistant professor of History at the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame from 2005-07. He previously taught U.S. foreign 
policy at the University of Cincinnati and George Washington Univer-
sity. His recent publications include "Sagacious Beyond Praise: Winfield 
Scott and Anglo-American-Canadian Boarder Diplomacy,'' with Scott 
Kaufman in Diplomatic History. 
THE AROOSTOOK WAR, a border dispute between Maine and New Brunswick, came to a head in February 1839 as local authorities in Maine and New Brunswick moved toward a showdown that 
neither London nor Washington desired. Before war could break out, 
however, President Martin Van Buren sent General Winfield Scott to 
Maine. A hero of the War of 1812 with a proven record of military suc-
cess against the British, Scott reassured residents of Maine that any 
British attack would be resisted. As a Whig representing a Democratic 
administration, he could promote bipartisan cooperation among 
Maine's politicians. This prevented either party from using bellicose 
rhetoric as a political ploy in the highly competitive state political arena. 
Scott also had the confidence of Sir John Harvey, his one-time military 
antagonist then serving as Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick. 
Scott's strength in combining diplomacy with the prospect of military 
force facilitated a truce by mid-March. One biographer wrote that 
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Winfield Scott was a Virginian whose father served in the American Revolution. 
During the War of 1812, the young lieutenant-colonel commanded troops along 
the Ca nadian border, and when he was ordered to mediate the border dispute 
kn own as the Aroostook War, he was already on his way to becom ing America's 
most prominent military figure. Edward D. Mansfield, Tire Life of Gc11ernl Wi11-
jicld Scott ( 1846). 
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"Scott's conduct in this tangle of motives and political cross-currents 
was sagacious beyond praise." More restrained, Maine's Governor John 
Fairfield wrote after the president's emissary arrived, "General Scott is 
here and is now the lion of the day." 1 
While Scott's background was largely military, this lion played a cru-
cial role in preventing armed conflict in the Aroostook War. There were 
only two reported fatalities in Maine during the war: a soldier who died 
of measles, and a Maine farmer killed by a ricocheting bullet at a peace 
celebration after the danger of war had passed. Because the dispute 
ended without open warfare, it possesses certain comic qualities; histori-
ans deride it as an "absurd bicker" and label it the "Pork and Beans War," 
a reference to the inordinate amount of money spent on provisioning 
the militia, relative to the little action they saw. "The episode," as one 
scholar noted, "has been viewed by historians with a good deal of merri-
ment."2 That the Aroostook War became a source of amusement rather 
than an armed conflict was due in good part to Scott's diplomatic suc-
cess in negotiating the problems posed by states' rights and party politics 
in Maine. 
Tensions Mount 
The troubles that culminated in the Aroostook War originated with 
the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which ended the American Revolutionary War. 
Relying on inaccurate maps and surveys, the treaty delineated a bound-
ary without correct landmarks, which led to disputes over which topo-
graphical features corresponded to those in the treaty. The boundary 
was not one of the major issues leading to the War of 1812, and thus it 
was not clarified by the Treaty of Ghent, which ended that conflict. In 
1827 the Americans and British approved a convention specifying rules 
for mediation of the dispute, appointing King William I of the Nether-
lands as arbitrator. Maine Governor Enoch Lincoln protested this ap-
pointment, stating to Secretary of State Henry Clay that the king "rarely 
decides upon strict principles of law" but was rather inclined "to try, if 
possible, to split the difference."3 In the estimation of Maine authorities, 
the state had valid title to all the land it claimed, and it was not interested 
in a compromise solution that simply divided the territory between the 
Americans and the British. 
During his stint as arbitrator, King William also dealt with the rebel-
lion of the former Dutch province of Belgium; the revolt and the conse-
quent weakening of the Netherlands brought the Dutch ruler into 
greater diplomatic dependence on the British and undermined his cred-
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ibility as an impartial mediator. When he finally announced his pro-
posed resolution of the Aroostook boundary dispute in 1831, he recom-
mended what the governor of Maine had feared: rather than select be-
tween the competing American and British interpretations of the 
boundary, he recommended a new line that divided the disputed terri-
tory between the Americans and the British. Although the British gov-
ernment approved the recommendation, the U.S. Senate objected, after 
impassioned arguments from the Maine delegation regarding the dan-
gers of ceding a state's territory without its consent. President Andrew 
Jackson preferred the compromise solution but would not endorse it 
without Maine's approval, and this plainly was not forthcoming. \'\Then 
the United States rejected the king's compromise, the British withdrew 
their endorsement.4 
In 1837 Martin Van Buren became president of the United States. 
Facing a host of pressing foreign and domestic issues, his administration 
allowed the northeastern border question to languish. The economic 
panic of 1837 brought various calls for government action, while agita-
tion for annexation of Texas and calls to aid the Upper Canadian Rebel-
lion demanded close attention. To deal with the troubles on the Cana-
dian border, Van Buren dispatched Winfield Scott to Detroit and to 
Niagara Falls, where he defused a mounting crisis.s 
The situation in Maine became more tenuous in the late 1830s when 
migrants from the Kennebec region discovered the agricultural potential 
of the Aroostook valley. Generally Maine lacked good agricultural land, 
but the Aroostook Valley's lime-rich soils would support the kind of sta-
ble farming population state authorities desperately wanted. While soil 
composition made the disputed territory especially valuable to Maine, 
military considerations shaped the British view of the dispute. A portion 
of the disputed territory near Madawaska had served as a winter land 
route between Halifax and Quebec since early colonial times, and when 
the sea-lanes of the St. Lawrence River froze, this route was essential to 
reaching Lower Canada. According to historian C.P. Stacey, the British 
had discovered in the War of 1812 that "the defense of Canada was pri-
marily a problem in communications,'' and accordingly they concerned 
themselves with transportation issues. 6 Lumbering was another issue 
that could not be ignored indefinitely. With no effective oversight in the 
disputed territory, Maine authorities watched as local British residents 
cut and hauled off much of the rich timber of the region. 
President Van Buren asked the governor of Maine to ascertain 
whether the state would support a negotiation of the 1783 boundary, 
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The treaty tihat ended the American Revolution fai led to delineate Maine's 
northeastern boundary. In the years after I 789, British diplomatts placed the 
boundary be~ween the Penobscot and St. John rivers, while Maine political lead-
ers insisted on the "height of land" between the St. John and the St. Lawrence. 
This difference gave rise to the skirmishes and diplomatic exchanges collectively 
known as the Aroostook War. Henry S. Burrage, Mni11e i11 the Northenstem 
Bou 11dary Co·11 troversy ( 1919). 
but the state legislature remained adamant, delivering what was essen-
tially an ultimatum to the federal government: Maine would conduct its 
own survey if the Van Buren admin istration did not proceed within a 
few months. Eventually Maine established its own boundary commis-
sion, and not sur prisingly, the commissioners concluded that the 
boundary intended by the 1783 treaty could be determined and no ne-
gotiation was necessary. Jn April 1838 Maine's Whig Governor Edward 
Kent urged the state's congressional delegation in Washington to work 
with the fed eral government, so that "if we resor t, in self-defense, to in-
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dependent action, there may be no imputation upon our State of neglect 
in setting forth her claims or declaring her ultimate determination."7 
In January 1839 Governor John Fairfield, a Democrat, dispatched an 
armed posse of 200 men under the direction of seventy-year-old Rufus 
Mcintire to arrest the trespassers cutting timber in the territory. A closed 
session of the Maine legislature authorized the action, but the secrecy of 
the resolution eventually became problematic, making it impossible for 
the Maine authorities to notify New Brunswick authorities of the nature 
of their maneuvers. With no official information about the armed band 
moving into the disputed territory, New Brunswick authorities were left 
to conclude the worst. After the posse arrested some trespassers and a 
British official named James Maclauchlan, British officials arrested 
Mcintire. Not willing to back down, the Maine authorities reinforced 
their posse. New Brunswick Lieutenant Governor General Sir John Har-
vey issued a proclamation claiming the United States and Britain had 
agreed that the British would have jurisdictional authority over the en-
tire territory until the boundary was finally settled, bringing an impas-
sioned outburst from Governor Fairfield.8 
As they stood on the brink of war, Maine and New Brunswick au-
thorities engaged in a testy correspondence. Harvey wrote on February 
18 that good relations made it "indispensable that the armed force from 
[Maine] ... be immediately withdrawn." Failure to withdraw would 
leave him "no alternative but to take military occupation" of the dis-
puted territory.9 The Solicitor-General of New Brunswick claimed the 
posse violated British and international law and called for the release of 
British official James Maclauchlan, and Fairfield promptly refused the 
request. Charles Jarvis, the Maine land agent who took command of the 
posse after Mcintire's arrest, closed his correspondence to the Solicitor-
General with a warning: "I shall consider the approach to my station by 
an armed force as an act of hostility, which will be met by me to the best 
of my ability." 10 With tension increasing, the Maine legislature appropri-
ated $800,000 for its defense. The governor called for 10,000 militiamen 
and immediately sent 2,000 soldiers on the long march toward the 
Aroostook Valley. Governor Fairfield wrote to President Van Buren com-
plaining of Mcintire's treatment, which he called "such an indignity to 
the State and the nation as cannot and ought not to be submitted to.'' 11 
Both Maclauchlan and Mcintire were released, but passions remained 
heated and calls for war became louder. Recognizing the possibility for 
open warfare, the U.S. Congress appropriated $10 million for the mili-
tary and authorized the president to call up 50,000 volunteers. 
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Others were caught up in the war fever as well. Massachusetts still 
owned half the public lands in Maine and therefore had a financial stake 
in the outcome of the dispute. Bay State residents prepared to raise mili-
tary companies to assist in the defense of Maine, and legislatures in 
Maryland, Alabama, Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indi-
ana all passed resolutions pledging "support in case of war." Likewise the 
legislative council in Nova Scotia indicated its willingness to support 
New Brunswick.12 
With tensions mounting, Fairfield wrote to Van Buren both officially 
and privately. Officially, he passed along copies of correspondence from 
Harvey and resolutions from the Maine legislature, and he described 
Maine's militia preparations. Unofficially and confidentially, he urged 
federal action: the people in Maine, he explained, would no longer sub-
mit to British aggression. "This is not a feverish and temporary excite-
ment that may manifest itself in a few rash [and] indiscreet acts and 
then die away"; it reflected Maine residents' "fixed purpose" and deter-
mination to "stand by their rights." Fairfield expressed concern over the 
political implications should Van Buren fail to act appropriately. Still, he 
closed on a conciliatory note: "while I am devoted to my state, I am also 
your devoted friend. God grant that my attachment and duties to each 
may never clash."13 
With local tensions increasing, Secretary of State John Forsyth en-
tered into negotiations with the British Minister in Washington, Henry 
S. Fox, hoping to reduce tension and facilitate a solution of the crisis. On 
February 23 Fox wrote to Forsyth to complain about "an unjustifiable 
incursion into a part of the disputed territory" and maintained that the 
United States had agreed to give Britain the right to exercise exclusive ju-
risdictional authority in the territory. Forsyth responded that Maine in-
tended "no military occupation of the territory," but simply sought to 
remove trespassers whose actions were in violation of the state's "right of 
property." 14 
The president submitted a complete report to Congress on the situa-
tion on February 26. Significantly, he took issue with Maine's decision to 
send the posse without notifying New Brunswick authorities. "Had the 
lieutenant-governor of New Brunswick been correctly advised of the 
nature of the proceedings of the State of Maine, he would not have 
regarded the transaction as requiring on his part any resort to force." 
Van Buren noted prior correspondence from the secretary of state to 
officials in Maine indicating that if negotiations to resolve the boundary 
were unsuccessful, the two nations would ''accomplish that object 
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In January I 839 Governor John 
Fairfield sent an armed posse of 200 
men to the disputed territory to 
stop the theft of timber along the 
Aroostook River. When the incident 
brought the two nations to the 
brink of war, President Martin Van 
Buren dispatched General Scott to 
Maine to negotiate a settlement. 
Burrage, Mai11e in the Northeastern 
Boundary Ccntroversy, and William 
Holland, Tl1e Life a11d Political 
Opi11io11s of Marti11 Van Buren 
(1835 ). 
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amicably ... by another arbitration, or by a commission, with an um-
pire." Thus Van Buren cautioned the residents of Maine that they should 
be prepared for a solution determined by an international referee. De-
spite his desire to avoid armed conflict, Van Buren informed Congress 
that he would consider it his constitutional duty to aid Maine, "if the au-
thorities of New Brunswick should attempt to enforce the claim of ex-
clusive jurisdiction set up by them by means of a military occupation on 
their part of the disputed territory." IS 
On February 27 Secretary of State Forsyth and Minister Fox signed 
the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum. The document began by acknowledging 
the different British and American understandings concerning jurisdic-
tion in the disputed territory, then it specified the conduct expected of 
both. Provincial authorities would "not seek to expel by military force 
the armed party which has been sent by Maine," and Maine would "vol-
untarily, and without needless delay, withdraw beyond the bounds of the 
disputed territory, any armed force now within them." The memoran-
dum also specified that each side would release any arrested civil officers, 
and that "nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to fortify or 
weaken in any respect whatever, the claim of either Party to the ultimate 
possession of the disputed territory." The memorandum noted that both 
signatories could "only recommend" that Maine and New Brunswick 
"regulate their future proceedings according to the terms . set forth, 
until the final settlement of the territorial dispute;' or until the United 
States and Great Britain resolved the question of jurisdiction. 16 
States' Rights, Party Conflict, and the Maine-New Brunswick Boundary 
Resolution of the northeast boundary dispute was complicated by 
some of the states' rights protections in the U.S. Constitution. Provisions 
of the Constitution prevented the federal government from surrender-
ing any state's territory without the approval of the state. During the 
Maine-New Brunswick dispute, Governor Fairfield argued that the 
states were "sovereign and independent, except so far as that sovereignty 
has been restrained or modified by the United States." He argued that 
"the power to alienate the territory of a State ... to a foreign power ... is 
no where granted."17 In Maine's case, the treaty of 1783 had specified a 
boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, and the difficulties in es-
tablishing the boundary intended by that treaty did not alter the fact 
that any concession to Britain was the equivalent of giving away territory 
to which Maine had a legitimate claim. Thus Senate approval of any res-
olution that Maine opposed would establish the precedent that the fed-
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eral government could negotiate away a state's territory. Concern over 
such a precedent complicated the negotiations with Britain. 
The federal government offered both Maine and Massachusetts offer 
of compensation with land in the western states if they would accept res-
olution of the boundary dispute. This met with the approval of Massa-
chusetts, which looked to its Maine land holdings simply for income and 
could derive satisfactory revenues from territory in the West. For Maine, 
however, there were questions of territorial integrity and population; the 
state looked to the Aroostook Valley as a region where fertile soil could 
support stable agriculture in a way that was impossible in other areas of 
Maine. For this reason, Maine rejected the federal offer of compensa-
tion. 
Throughout the crisis Maine insisted on the right to protect its own 
territorial claims. Governor Fairfield cautioned against rushing into mil-
itary confrontation-a "calamity too dreadful to be lightly hazarded"-
but he insisted that there was "a point beyond which forbearance would 
be more than pusillanimity. It would be treason against" future genera-
tions. In a passage that illustrated the way states could manipulate events 
to force Washington's involvement, he announced that "if Maine should 
take possession of her territory, up to the line of the treaty of 1783, ... 
any attempt on the part of the British government to wrest that posses-
sion from her must bring the general government to her aid and de-
fense."18 While Fairfield conceded that such steps would be taken only 
after "mature deliberation," he nonetheless recognized that the state 
could take steps that would require federal military involvement. 
Maine justified its military force in Aroostook not by federal man-
date but by state authority. Charles Jarvis insisted that he was "here un-
der the direction of the executive of the State, and must remain until 
otherwise ordered by the only authority recognized by me; and deeply as 
I should regret a conflict between our respective countries, I shall con-
sider the approach to my station by an armed force as an act of hostility, 
which will be met by me to the best of my ability." 19 Jarvis's statement 
suggested that he might not recognize the authority of the federal gov-
ernment unless it were endorsed by Governor Fairfield. Such apparent 
disregard for national authority, widely endorsed by Maine political 
leaders, complicated efforts by Washington and London to resolve this 
cns1s. 
Partisan politics posed a second challenge. By the 1830s, the political 
arena had been polarized by the continuing debates over slavery and ex-
pansion in the West. In national politics Democrats tended to support 
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expansion, while the Whigs were more restrained. Northern Whigs op-
posed expansion because it often targeted territory adjacent to the 
southern states, where slavery was likely to be imported.20 These na-
tional issues infused state politics with a great deal of fervor, and in 
Maine this intransigence further complicated efforts to resolve the 
boundary crisis. One reason Maine had been so hostile to the Dutch 
King's arbitration, a historian suggests, was that "neither party was will-
ing, given the excited state of opinion, to yield an inch to the British."21 
In the 1830s and early 1840s Maine voters were divided almost equally 
between Whigs and Democrats, and control of the government shifted 
frequently from one party to the other. In 1838, the faction-ridden De-
mocrats united behind John Fairfield and won the governorship by 
roughly 3,300 votes out of nearly 90,000 cast. Whigs immediately at-
tacked the new administration for its "soft" position on the boundary 
dispute.22 
As tensions mounted in the disputed territory, both Whig and De-
mocrat newspapers called for action against the British. When the state 
dispatched Mcintire to the border, the Bangor Whig reported that it was 
"wholly in favor of the object of this expedition," even though the men 
leading it were Democrats, whom the paper labeled "brawling and noisy 
politicians." When the British captured Rufus Mcintire, the Whig allied 
with Democratic leaders, complaining that "our State has been for the 
third time invaded and our citizens carried away and incarcerated in a 
FOREIGN JAIL!"23 In Portland, the Whig papers assured their readers 
that despite differences with the governor they would support his action 
against the British. To inspire militia members to steel themselves for 
confrontation with the British, the Belfast Republican coined the slogan, 
"Maine and Her soil, or BLOOD!" A Montreal newspaper noted that 
"Whigs and Democrats, so opposed on almost all other questions, think 
alike" on this question "and demand war with equal enthusiasm." Out-
side of Maine, however, Whig journals advocated a peaceful settlement. 
According to scholar David Lowenthal, the "Whig journals of Boston 
and New York considered Governor Fairfield a hot-headed fanatic who 
was rushing the country into war. Commercial interests deprecated his 
policy."24 
The signing of the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum on February 27 an-
gered many in Maine who thought Washington had compromised the 
interests of the state. Maine Senator John Ruggles complained that "the 
Administration has no notion of backing Maine in the vindication of 
her rights." He groused that legislators such as Silas Wright of New York, 
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Pennsylvania's James Buchanan, and John Calhoun of South Carolina 
were all working against Maine's efforts to secure support from the 
Washington government. Van Buren, according to Ruggles, looked after 
the interests of the South and the West in order to ensure his re-election. 
"Maine bows down and worships the Administration from which it re-
ceives nothing but insult."25 With both parties in Maine contributing to 
the furor, the Democratic administration in Washington, shaken from 
its hopes that the contention over the Maine boundary would blow over, 
sent Winfield Scott to Maine to seek a peaceful resolution of the situa-
tion. 
Winfield Scott and the Triumph of Bipartisanship 
Winfield Scott was an unlikely candidate to play the role of hero-
pacifier. Described by a biographer as "an aristocrat of the old school, 
and a good deal of a snob," he had pronounced philosophical objections 
to the democratization of American life and politics during the Jackson-
ian period. His distaste for Jacksonian democracy led to his involvement 
with the Whig party that rose in opposition to Old Hickory's leadership 
and policies. Scott eventually became the party's presidential nominee 
and was defeated in the 1856 election. At odds with the Democratic Van 
Buren and Fairfield administrations, he was also cool to the idea of mili-
tia and citizen-soldiers, his experience in 1812-1814 having taught him 
that war was a matter best left to professionals.26 In many respects Scott 
was the opposite of Andrew Jackson, who relished his command of large 
numbers of militia in the Battle of New Orleans and who became a 
champion of democracy and the common man. In fact, earlier clashes 
between Jackson and Scott culminated in an exchange of letters so 
heated that Jackson challenged Scott to a duel. 
Although Van Buren dispatched Scott to Maine in "absolute confi-
dence" and in "cordial friendship," Scott's earlier regard for Van Buren 
had cooled, and in fact he might have been thinking of Van Buren as a 
potential rival in an upcoming presidential election. This distancing, 
coupled with Scott's usual pomposity and arrogance, might have com-
plicated his relationship with Maine's Jacksonian leaders. Nor was Scott's 
personality particularly engaging. An aide reported that "the chief ruling 
passion of the general was ambition and its uniform attendant, jeal-
ousy." Ulysses S. Grant wrote that Scott "cultivated a style peculiar his 
own" and that he "was not averse to speaking of himself, often in the 
third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking 
about with the least embarrassment." In short, few expected Scott's mis-
r 
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Major General John Harvey, K.C.B. 
In 1836-1837 Harvey was lieutenant 
governor of Prince Edward Island, 
and from 1837 to 1841, lieutenant 
governor of New Brunsiwck. He went 
on to serve as governor of Newfound-
land between 1841 and 1846. As a 
lieutenant colonel in the War of 1812, 
Harvey encountered Scott across the 
battle lines, and later th·e t\-vo became 
friends. This proved useful when the 
American general arrived in Maine to 
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sion to Maine to end in success. In addition to his difficult personality, 
het would be contending against angry Maine residents. Before depart-
ing for Maine, he himself told Van Buren "if you want war, I need only 
look on in silence. The Maine people will make it for you fast and hot 
enough . . . . [B]ut if peace be your wish, I can give no assurance of 
success."27 
The general arrived in Maine shortly after the signing of the Fox-
Forsyth Memorandum, at a time when frustration with the federal gov-
ernment was at fever pitch. "If the contemplated visit of General Scott to 
Maine is only to persuade a withdrawal of our troops from the disputed 
territories, or a relinquishment of our present position, he might as well 
stay away;' a state senator complained. When Scott arrived in Augusta, he 
"found a bad temper prevailing." Democrats were "dominant in every 
branch of Government," but in the legislature "the weight of talent and 
information, .. . was in the Whig minority." Both parties played to a con-
stituency clamoring for military action, Scott recalled; "the Whigs were 
unwilling to abandon that hobby-horse entirely; but the Democrats were 
first in the saddle and rode furiously." In time, Scott would help both 
parties off of that hobby-horse.28 
Scott won favor in Maine by criticizing the Fox-Forsyth Memoran-
dum, calling it a "bungle" in which the "people of Maine ... were re-
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quired to withdraw their forces from the territory in dispute simply on 
the promise that British officers would not seek to expel them by force!-
without any reciprocal obligation;-the other party being left free to re-
main; to fortify themselves; to continue their depredations, undisturbed, 
and for an indefinite time!" 29 Scott's prior relationship with Sir John 
Harvey also aided his efforts to bring peace to the Maine frontier. The 
two had dealt with each other as combatants during the War of 1812, 
and in fact Scott was responsible for sparing Harvey's life at one point. 
Later, Scott purchased and returned to Harvey a portrait of Harvey's 
wife stolen during the American raid on York, Ontario.30 Thus despite 
their prior status as combatants in rival armies, Scott and Harvey had es-
tablished a reservoir of good will, which Scott could utilize to ease the 
cns1s. 
Harvey wrote to Scott on January 13 indicating "the high degree of 
satisfaction which I had individually derived from hearing of your selec-
tion for the very delicate and difficult command on the frontier of the 
northern states opposite the British provinces." Harvey expressed hope 
that the two could meet in person to resolve issues. Scott responded by 
requesting a declaration that New Brunswick would not seek to expel 
the Maine posse by force, as specified in the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum. 
Were Harvey to make such a declaration, Scott reported, the troops of 
Maine would no doubt "be immediately recalled and the detachment, in 
march thither from the interior of the State, be at once ordered to halt." 
Scott explained that a civil posse, "limited to a small number ... and re-
stricted to certain specific duties," would remain in the territory, but 
otherwise, "if we can avoid collision on the Northeastern Frontier it is 
not likely that the United States" would send federal troops to Maine. 
Harvey noted the need to defend access to a portion of the St. John Val-
ley essential to British communications, but reported that British troops 
would avoid "offensive operations" against the posse-again in accor-
dance with the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum.31 Although residents and 
leaders in Maine had earlier derided the memorandum, and Scott him-
self had publicly criticized it, it nonetheless became the basis for agree-
ment once Scott convinced the two political parties in Maine to accept a 
peaceful course of action. 
Scott next turned to Maine's political leaders. When he arrived in 
Maine, his party affiliation had been unknown. Maine Whigs, seeing 
him as a representative of the Democratic administration in Washing-
ton, assumed he was a Democrat, or viewed him as an apolitical Army 
officer. After winning Fairfield's confidence, Scott revealed his party af-
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Maine politicians insisted that under the Constitution the federa l governmen t 
could not surrender a state's territory without the stale 's explicit approval. 
Maine would defend its territorial rights against 1ew Brunswick-and against 
an overly conciliatory federal government in Washington. Burrage, Mni11e i11 the 
Northeastern Bo1111d11ry Co 11tro11ersy. 
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filiation and suggested that he approach the Whigs in the state legisla-
ture to solicit their support for a peaceful resolution. At a dinner party 
with Whig U.S. Senator George Evans and leading Democrats from the 
Maine legislature, Scott seated himself among the Whigs. Initially, he 
found them "sulky" and unresponsive, until Evans called to their atten-
tion his political affiliations, calling Scott "as good a Whig as the best of 
them."32 
Shortly thereafter, Governor Fairfield addressed the legislature, 
claiming that the people of Maine were "not desirous of hurrying the 
two nations into a war." Such an event was "anxiously to be avoided, if it 
can be without dishonor," he continued. "We owe too much to the 
Union, to ourselves, and above all, to the spirit and principles of Chris-
tianity, to bring about a conflict of arms with a people having with us a 
common origin, speaking a common language, and bound to us by so 
many ties of common interest." Fairfield told the legislators that he was 
"fully satisfied" that the New Brunswick authorities had "abandoned all 
idea of occupying the disputed territory with a military force, and of at-
tempting an expulsion of our party."33 With the blessing of the legisla-
ture, he agreed to Scott's proposal. In anticipation of a peaceful resolu-
tion of the boundary dispute, Maine would halt its military efforts in the 
disputed territory and the authorities of New Brunswick would not seek 
to expel the Maine forces. 
Despite misgivings about the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum, Scott won 
support from Maine leaders for an agreement remarkably similar in 
form and substance. The key difference between the earlier document 
and the agreement signed by John Fairfield and Sir John Harvey in mid-
March was its timing and Scott's careful preparation. Scott carefully con-
sulted both political parties in Maine, thereby removing the issue from 
the realm of partisan conflict, and at the same time his stalling allowed 
the fervor for war to subside and the militia to grow weary of mundane 
drilling duty. By March, it was politically acceptable for the Fairfield ad-
ministration to agree to a truce that may have been problematic a month 
or two earlier. 
Along with Scott's diplomatic handling of the situation, John Fair-
field's political tact was key to the resolution of the dispute. The gover-
nor's insistence upon the imperatives of honor increased the difficulty of 
resolving the situation, but his calmness in pointing out the "un-Christ-
ian" nature of warfare among people bound by ties of language and cus-
tom facilitated a peaceful solution. With the easing of tension in spring 
1839, it was possible for the United States and Britain to move toward 
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While the fortifications buil t so hastily in the spri ng of 1839 were never used in 
battle, they left their names as testimony to the two governors mostr involved in 
the volatile events of 1839. Fort Kent, named for Edward Kent, still stands on 
the banks of the St. John River, as does Fort Fairfield on the Aroostook, named 
for the Democratic governor who followed h im into office. Burrage, Maine i11 
the Northeastern Boul/(fary Co11troversy. 
settlement of the boundary, which would come with the 1842 Webster-
Ashburton Treaty that established the border along the St. John and St. 
Francis rivers-neither to the north, at the watershed ben"/een the St. 
Lawrence and the St. John, as Maine had insisted, nor to the south, be-
tween the Penobscot and the St. John watersheds, as the British had 
claimed. 
The Legacy of Partisan Politics and States' Rights 
With the election of 1840 looming, it might have been difficult to 
bring Whigs and Democrats together to resolve the boundary question. 
But with a Whig general representing the Democrat administration, bi-
partisan agreement was easier to achieve, and the Aroostook War be-
came the struff of legend or comedy, rather than the starting point of the 
third British-American war in sixty years. Timing was essential to this 
outcome. What seemed unacceptable in late February, with the Maine 
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militia newly mustered on the northeastern border and war fervor at its 
peak, was just a few short weeks later seen as an honorable way to avoid 
hostilities. 
Winfield Scott, despite his reputation as a pompous, self-important 
Whig, was indispensable in resolving the conflict surrounding the 
Maine-New Brunswick border. He accomplished his goals by providing 
a level of credibility that reassured the people of Maine and the British 
authorities in New Brunswick. No less important, his negotiations 
bought enough time to let the enthusiasm for war pass, while assem-
bling the political factors necessary to assure bipartisan agreement in 
Maine.34 The crisis on the border in 1839 proved that unresolved issues 
could bring these nations to the brink of war, but it also proved that 
there was much in the relationship between the British, the Canadians, 
and the Americans that could make for an enduring rapprochement, if 
the proper restraints were observed and exercised. 
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